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Critical in the computationalist account of the mind is the phenomenon 
called computational or computer simulation of human thinking, which is 
used to establish the theses that human thinking is a computational process 
and that computing machines are thinking systems. Accordingly, if human 
thinking can be simulated computationally then human thinking is  a 
computational process; and if human thinking  is a computational process 
then its computational simulation is itself a thinking process. This paper 
shows that the said phenomenon—the computational simulation of human 
thinking—is ill-conceived, and that, as a consequence, the theses that it  
intends to establish are problematic. It is argued that what is simulated 
computationally is not human thinking as such but merely its behavioral 
manifestations; and that a computational simulation of these behavioral 
manifestations does not necessarily establish that human thinking is 
computational, as it is logically possible for a non -computational system to 






In addition to our physical activities, we go about our everyday lives  engaging 
in mental activities such as thinking, making decisions, wishing, imagining, and 
experiencing pains and pleasures. As we attribute our physical activities to the 
workings of our bodies, we attribute our mental activities to the workings of our 
minds. But as we continue to know a great deal about our bodies and their physical 
environment, our minds remain to be a mystery. Yet our minds form an important part 
of what defines who we are as humans and as individual persons, for it is essentially 
in reference to our minds that we distinguish ourselves from the rest of nature and 
from one another. If we are to  <76> fully understand who we are and our proper place 
in nature, we therefore need to understand the nature of our minds.   
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It used to be held that science could afford to ignore the human mind in its 
investigations, mainly believing that it is a subject matter better left to the 
philosophers and theologians. But somehow the idea that science can never be 
complete or comprehensive in its account of nature unless it also deals with the nature 
of the human mind persists. And so there have been natural scientists, 
mathematicians, and philosophers, who have attempted to come up with a scientific 
account of the workings of the human mind. Initial formulat ions of this account were 
met with doubts and skepticism, but with the entry of computer technology into the 
scene, things have taken a revolutionary turn. With its enormous capacity for 
simulating a wide variety of phenomena, the dreamt-of science of the mind is then 
believed to be already within reach.  
The use of computers in understanding the human mind has given rise to the 
computational theory of mind or computationalism for short, according to which the 
human mind is a computational system or a kind of computer, and that the computer 
itself is a kind of mind. In the field of computer science, this theory has been labeled 
Strong Artificial Intentelligence or Strong AI for short. The projected science of the 
mind grounded in this theory has come to be known as Cognitive Science.  The 
popularity of this theory extends from academic circles to the entertainment business, 
as shown by the proliferation of sci-fi movies whose themes often revolve around the 
possibility of creating machines that would eventually evolve into conscious beings 
and thereby acquiring the capacity for making autonomous decisions and for 
experiencing complex emotions like love, anguish, and the fear of death.  
The computationalist argument, in the main, comes down to the following. If 
human thinking can be simulated computationally then human thinking itself is a 
computational process. This establishes the view that the human mind is a 
sophisticated type of computer. Now if human thinking is a c omputational process 
then the computational simulation of human thinking itself thinks. 2 And this 
establishes the view that the computer, with the appropriate degree of sophistication, 
possesses a mind. These considerations show how critical is the possibi lity of a 
computational simulation of human thinking in establishing the theses of 
computationalism.  
In this paper, I will argue that the phenomenon called “computer simulation of 
human thinking” is ill-conceived, and that, as a consequence, what it hopes  to 
accomplish—the theses of computationalism—are problematic. I will argue that it is 
not human thinking as such that is simulated computationally but its behavioral 
manifestations or outputs; and that a computational simulation of the behavioral 
manifestations of human thinking does not necessar ily establish that human thinking 
is computational, as it is logically possible  <77> for a non-computational system to 
exhibit behaviors that lend themselves to a computational simulation. My discussion 
is divided into three parts. The first looks into the  competing viewpoints on the nature 
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of the mind in relation to its possible computational simulation. The second inquires 
into what is really being simulated computationally when we speak of a computational 
simulation of human thinking. And the third probes into the type of simulation that 
takes place in a computational simulation of human thinking.  
 
THE ALTERNATIVE VIEWPOINTS 
 
In his book, Shadows of the mind  (1994, 12), Roger Penrose lists four alternative 
positions on the relation of human thinking to its possible computational simulation:  
 
A. All thinking is computation; in particular, feelings of conscious 
awareness are evoked merely by the carrying out of appropriate 
computations. 
B. Awareness is a feature of the brain’s physical action; and whereas  
any physical action can be simulated computationally, 
computational simulation cannot by itself evoke   awareness.  
C. Appropriate physical action of the brain evokes awareness, but this 
physical action cannot even be simulated computationally.  
D. Awareness cannot be explained by physical, computational, or any 
other scientific terms.  
 
Each of these alternative positions represents a particular viewpoint regarding 
the nature of the mind. Position A is the viewpoint of strong AI, which is the main 
proponent of computationalism in the field of computer science. This viewpoint, as 
earlier pointed, regards human thinking as a computational process. More precisely, 
it looks at the mind-brain relation as a species of the software-hardware relation in 
that the mind is to software as the brain is to hardware. Consequently, computers, 
with the appropriate degree of sophistication, are regarded by this viewpoint as 
thinking systems or as machines possessing minds. 
Position B is the viewpoint that Penrose attributes to weak AI and, to some 
extent, to the view of John Searle (see 1980, 1990, 1994, 1999, and 2004) as 
embedded in his popular Chinese room argument. In contrast to strong AI which 
claims that the human mind is literally a computer, weak AI merely claims that the 
computer is a powerful tool for understanding the workings of the human mind. On 
the other hand, the said view of Searle refers to his claim that while it can be granted 
that human thinking is a computational process it is not all there is to human thinking; 
for human thinking, for Searle, is also inherently intentional, which a mere 
computational system, such as the computer, is not.  <78> 
Position C is the viewpoint that Penrose himself endorses. For Penrose, human 
thinking is not a computational process, which he proves by means of Gödel’s 
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incompleteness theorem. Accordingly, since a computational system cannot prove the 
truth of certain propositions that are outside its system while human thinking can —
as demonstrated by Gödel’s incompleteness theorem,  it follows that human thinking 
is not a computational system. Now as human thinking is not a computational system, 
then it cannot, for Penrose, be simulated computationally. Despite being non -
computational, Penrose, however , maintains that human thinking is still a physical 
process and hence in principle can be accounted for by science, for he believes that 
human consciousness in general is a result of the quantum activities in the brain’s 
microtubules. Quantum mechanics is here regarded by Penrose as a physical and 
scientific theory that is non-computational.      
Position D is the viewpoint of the Cartesian dualism. The very reason why human 
thinking cannot be simulated on this view is that it regards the mind as something 
metaphysical and hence not within the grasp of science.   
A critical assumption can be observed in all these positions, namely, that a 
computational system can be simulated computationally while a non -computational 
system cannot be simulated computationally. This grounds the reasoning that if a 
system can be simulated computationally then it is itself a computational system. 
Positions A and B claim that human thinking can be simulated computationally for 
human thinking is a computational process. Again, the  difference between positions 
A and B is simply that position A believes that being a computational process is all 
there is to human thinking such that the computational simulation of human thinking 
itself thinks, while position B believes that there is more to human thinking than 
being a computational process—its inherent intentionality—such that the 
computational simulation of human thinking does not itself think. Positions A and B, 
however, both claim that human thinking is a physical process and hence c an be 
accounted for by science.   
On the other hand, positions C and D claim that human thinking cannot be 
simulated computationally for human thinking is not a computational process. Again 
the difference between positions C and D is that position C claims  that human 
thinking is nonetheless a physical process and hence can be accounted for by science, 
while position D claims that human thinking is a non-physical process and hence 
cannot be accounted for by science. In the following discussions, we shall loo k more 
closely into this assumption.  
 
THE OBJECTS OF SIMULATION  
 
In the course of expounding the position that he endorses, Penrose gives three 
formulations of his position which point to three aspects of human thinking that he 
claims cannot be simulated computationally, namely: (1) thinking (understanding or 
consciousness) itself, (2) the <79> outward effects or the behavioral manifestations 
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of thinking, and (3) the physical actions of the brain that evoke thinking. Penrose 
fails to clarify the relations among these three aspects of human thinking, whether, 
for instance, he regards them to be identical or as logically implying one another. In 
any case, Penrose’s three formulations of his position speak of three types of 
computational simulation involving human thinking whose relations with one another 
need to be clarified. These types of computational simulations are as follows:  
 
CS1: The computational simulation of thinking  
CS2:  The computational simulation of brain’s physical actions that evoke 
thinking 
CS3.  The computational simulation of the behavioral manifestations of  
thinking  
 
The first question that we need to raise is whether these three types of 
computational simulations, or any two of them, are identical to one another. To begin 
with, CS2 and CS3 obviously cannot be identical nor can CS2 can be regarded as a 
sub-class of CS3. The simple reason is that brain activities are events involving the 
neurons while behaviors are physical movements involving the external parts of the 
body (see Jaegwon Kim 1998, 29). 
Consequently, the possibility that CS1, CS2, and CS3 are all identical is likewise 
ruled out. And thus we are left with the possible identity between CS1 and CS2 on 
the one hand, and between CS1 and CS3 on the other. Now, to say that CS1 is the 
same as CS2 is to adhere to the (mind-brain) identity theory which claims that mental 
states are nothing but brain states; while to say that CS1 is the same as CS3 is to 
adhere to behaviorism (here regarded in its radical form), which claims that mental 
states are nothing but behaviors or, more specifically, behavioral dispositions. These 
two theories, the identity theory and behaviorism, however, are rejected by 
computationalism. Accordingly, mental states as computational states are higher -
level physical states which are not reducible to either the physical states of the brain 
or of the body, which are the lower-level physical states. And since what is at issue 
are the claims of computationalism, we then have to disregard in our analysis the 
possible identity between CS1 and CS2 on the one hand, and between CS1 and CS3 
on the other.   
The next question that we need to deal with is: If not by identity then what kind 
of relation exists, on the one hand, between CS1 and CS2, and on the other, between 
CS1 and CS3? Let us begin with the consideration on whether CS1 can be established 
directly. If we suppose that it can be established directly then CS2 and CS3 simply 
become superfluous. For why would we still want or even bother to simulate 
computationally the physical actions of the brain that cause understanding or the 
behavioral manifestations of understanding when <80> what we really want to 
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understand is the nature of understanding itself which we can computationally 
simulate directly?  
Granted that CS1 cannot be established directly then the next question is in what 
way are CS2 and CS3 relevant in establishing CS1. Roger Schank (1984, 53 -54) 
argues that only CS3 is relevant in establishing CS1. Schank (1984, 39) explains that 
examining the inner processes of a system that allegedly enable such system to 
produce outputs to which understanding can be ascribed is either extremely difficult 
to do or does not really establish much. It is extremely difficult to do because if one’s 
brain is cut open so that what is happening with its neurons while one is having some 
mental states can be directly observed or so that one can establish a direct correlation 
between a particular physical activity of the brain and a particular mental state, the 
brain will most likely be damaged or  worse it will cease to function. But even if 
assuming that a direct observation of the inner processes can be done, Schank argues 
that it does not really say much. Why? It will be observed that a given behavior can 
be directly correlated to some mental state. For instance, a certain behavior can be 
said to be a manifestation of pain. A certain brain state, however, cannot be directly 
correlated to a particular mental state, for it requires the mediation of some form of 
behavior. For instance, if we simply know that some neurons in our brain are firing, 
without correlating them with some pain behavior of ours, we would not know that 
such brain activity is about some pain of ours.  
Schank (1984, 55) further elaborates that the situation is no different from t he 
one in which we are to determine whether extraterrestrials are capable of 
understanding or thinking. Since we do not know anything about their physiology 
then no amount of examining their “insides” (for all we know they may not even have 
brains that more or less resemble ours) would tell us that they are capable of 
understanding. The only way, in this regard, to determine whether they are capable 
of understanding is to examine their behaviors.  
Schank’s point actually just follows Alan Turing’s in his im itation game. 
Turing’s  imitation game, popularly known as the Turing test, makes a certain type of 
human behavior to which thinking is naturally attributed as the criterion for 
determining whether machines can also be said to be intelligent. Such type of 
behavior involves providing answers to certain questions (Turing 1995, 25). The task 
of the machine is to mimic this type of behavior in ways that the interrogator would 
not be able to distinguish between the machine and the human. Accordingly, if the 
interrogator cannot distinguish between the human and the machine on the basis of 
their answers to the questions thrown to them, then the machine is said to pass the 
Turing test and hence can be said to be capable of thinking. Here, in order to separate 
the irrelevant features of the machine and human respondents or those features of 
theirs that will make the interrogator’s judgment unfair, the interrogator  <81> is 
separated from the human and machine respondents by a wall wherein the 
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interrogator’s only access to the respondents is through their textual communication 
via a teletype machine. Thus, the interrogator has no access to the voice and other 
external physical features of the respondents.  
The point is that the relevant consideration for the question on whethe r a machine 
thinks, in the context of the imitation game, is whether this machine can mimic the 
thinking behavior of the human. Consequently, whether the machine is run by a 
computer program or by some other mechanism, is not relevant to the question. If a  
machine that is run by a computer program passes the Turing test, the fact that it is 
run by a computer program is not what is relevant; what is relevant is whether the 
machine is able to exhibit outputs that mimic the thinking behaviors of the human. 
 
VARIETIES OF COMPUTER SIMULATION  
 
Our investigations thus far have led us to the conclusion that human thinking is 
never directly simulated computationally. What are directly simulated 
computationally are merely the behavioral manifestations or outputs of hu man 
thinking, which we can simply refer to as thinking behaviors . That being the case, 
our inquiry is thus reduced to the following questions:  
 
1. Does the computational simulation of the thinking behaviors of humans 
imply that human thinking itself is computational?  
2. Does the computational simulation of the thinking behaviors of humans 
imply that the simulating system itself thinks?  
 
Let us again consider the Turing test. The point of Turing is merely consistency 
in the attribution of thinking. The reasoning of Turing is that since humans are said 
to be thinking when they behave in certain ways, a machine that behaves in similar 
ways should therefore be said to be thinking as well without prejudice to its being a 
machine. In this regard, the conclusion that the machine thinks is not arrived at via 
the fact that the machine’s internal mechanism or processes simulate the internal 
processes of human thinking, but via the fact that the machine’s external or behavioral 
outputs simulate human thinking behaviors. Thus we are here talking about a 
simulation that takes place not between the internal mechanisms of two systems or of 
the internal mechanism of a simulating system and the external outputs of a simulated 
system, but between the external outputs of two systems.    
To get a grip of the implications of the consideration made above, let us examine 
certain types of computer simulation or various forms that a computer simulation can 
assume. Consider the difference between  <82> a computer simulating how two 
persons played a chess game and a computer simulating how a human would play 
chess by actually playing chess with a human. In the former case, the simulation just 
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replicates a chess game that was already played and as such can be called a purely 
representational simulation. In the latter case, however, the simulation takes place 
while the computer interacts with a human or responds to some external stimuli. Here, 
we do not know in advance how the game will exactly be played. We can call this 
type of computer simulation, to distinguish it from the former one, an interactive 
simulation.3 The relationship between these two types of simulation is that an 
interactive simulation is necessarily a representational simulation as well for 
representation is the most basic level of simulation, but a representational simulation 
need not be interactive as well.   
Consider another difference. It is different when a computer simulation of some 
human physical movement can only be viewed on the computer monitor and when a 
computer simulation of the same is carried out by some mechanical system, say a 
robot. In the former we just have a graphical representation of the human physical 
movement that we can view on the computer monitor. In the latter, it is the physical 
movement of the machine run by a computer program that simulates the same human 
physical movement. Here, we can distinguish between two types of computer 
simulation: the simulation that takes place merely on the level of the computer 
monitor, which we can refer to simply as graphical simulation; and the simulation 
that takes place on the level of the physical movements of a machine run by a 
computer program, which we can refer to as mechanical simulation.  A graphical 
simulation, of course, need not translate into a mechanical one. While, for instance, 
a graphical simulation of the weather can, in principle, be done, a mechanical 
simulation of it will be extremely difficult, if not altogether physically impossible, 
to do.  
Now, in light of the previous distinction between purely representational and 
interactive simulation, we can thus have, on the one hand, a graphical simulation that 
can either be merely representational or interactive; and on the other hand, a 
mechanical simulation that can likewise either be merely representat ional or 
interactive. Let us take the case of a computer simulation of the human heart. Such 
simulation can take place only on the level of the computer monitor wherein one can 
view how the human heart functions. This is a graphical simulation of the human  
heart, which can be merely representational, wherein the program allows the user to 
use certain commands to easily jump from one image or piece of information about 
the human heart to another. But it can also be interactive in that it allows the user to 
interact with the program, say the user can input certain conditions in order to 
determine how the human heart will react. On the other hand, the simulation of the 
human heart can also involve a mechanical entity that simulates the physical 
movements of the actual <83> human heart. This then is a mechanical simulation of 
the human heart, which can be called a “mechanical heart”. This mechanical heart 
may be such that it only mimics the physical movements of the human heart but does 
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not actually function as a heart in the sense that it actually pumps actual human blood. 
In this case, such mechanical simulation is a purely representational simulation. But 
if it actually functions as a heart in the sense that it actually pumps actual human 
blood then such mechanical simulation is interactive as well.  
An important thing to consider here is that in creating a program that would 
enable a machine to simulate human behaviors representationally or interactively, 
graphically or mechanically, the programmers are not really d esigning the program 
by simulating computationally such behaviors. They are designing the program, or 
the appropriate computations, that would enable the machine that it runs to exhibit 
outputs that would simulate human behaviors. In this regard, the types  of computer 
simulations that we have considered thus far are actually just variants of a more 
general kind of simulation which we can refer to as behavioral simulation . As the 
term implies, a system behaviorally simulates another system when the former sy stem 
behaves in ways that simulates the behaviors of the latter system.  
But a behavioral simulation need not be run by a computer program. When 
humans, for instance, behaviorally simulates the movements of fellow humans, say a 
child mimicking the mannerisms of his or her parents or teachers, or the physical 
movements of certain animals, as when children play the role of animals in a play, 
what we have is a type of simulation that is not or need not be run by a computer 
program. Other examples include aliens or extra-terrestrials behaviorally simulating 
the physical movements of humans, and some physical movements in nature happen 
to simulate human behaviors, say a group of clouds or stars simulating human figures 
in motion. We cannot say that the behavioral  simulations that take place here are run 
by computer programs. To distinguish between these two types of behavioral 
simulation, we can refer to the type that is run by a computer program as 
computational behavioral simulation , whereas we can refer to that  type that is not 
run by a computer program as non-computational behavioral simulation.   
If a behavioral simulation simulates the actual functions of what is being 
simulated, we can call this type of simulation a functional simulation . For instance, 
if a mechanical simulation of the human heart is able to function like a human heart 
in the sense that it can replace the human heart then such simulation is a functional 
simulation. If not,  then it is merely a behavioral simulation. Note that a functional 
simulation is necessarily interactive but may be graphical or mechanical depending 
on the nature of what is being simulated. A functional simulation of the human heart 
is necessarily interactive and mechanical. A functional simulation of the human heart 
as seen only on a computer monitor does not really simulate the actual functions of 
the human heart. <84> On a computer monitor the simulated human heart only pumps 
simulated blood. But a mechanical heart can simulate the actual functions of a human 
heart in that it can be made to pump actual blood. In contrast, a functional simulation 
of human thinking is necessarily interactive but may be graphical or mechanical. 
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When a computer, for instance, simulates the human activity of playing chess, the 
simulation must be interactive but it may be graphical, as when the computer plays 
the game of chess with a human via the computer monitor, or mechanical, as when a 
robot run by a computer program plays with a human. For the human activity of 
answering questions, Turing claims that all that is required is that its simulation is 
interactive and it is irrelevant whether it is graphical or mechanical.  
There are, of course, other possible types of computer simulation but the 
differences that we have identified will do for our purposes. These distinctions will 
help clarify what is really involved in certain arguments used both to challenge and 
defend the claims of  computationalism. But here is the critical question: Is a 
functional simulation necessarily a computational simulation? Another way of 
putting this is: Is functional simulation necessarily run by a computer program? In so 
far as a behavioral simulation need not be computational, so is a functional 
simulation. To demonstrate this, let us consider the following thought experi ment, 
which is actually just an extension of Schank’s about the extra -terrestrial. Let us take 
the case of Superman, one of the popular fictional superheroes. Story has it that 
Superman is an alien who disguises as a human in the person of Clark Kent. 
Considering his superpowers, some of which are his abilities to fly, lift extremely 
heavy objects, see through solid objects, cut objects through his laser vision, and 
throw heavy objects using just his breath, and a strange cause of weakness, namely 
exposure to kryptonite, his whole body must surely be made of stuff very much 
different from what ours are made of, though from the outside it surely looks like that 
of a human. Just think of the fact that bullets cannot even scratch his skin though it 
certainly looks like ours. Likewise his “brain” or “mind” or that which somehow 
corresponds to what we call such must also be different in composition, structure, 
and functions from ours. But Superman does not only look like a human being. He is 
also capable of behaving as a normal human being when he plays the role of Clark 
Kent by intentionally committing some of the follies and manifesting some of the 
weaknesses humans are naturally prone to. We can thus meaningfully say that 
Superman as Clark Kent can easily pass the Turing test, as evidenced by his success 
in making most people around him believe that he is a normal human being.  
Let us suppose that in the imitation game of Turing, aside from the human and 
machine respondents we add an alien respondent in the perso n of Superman playing 
the role of Clark Kent. With his superpowers, Superman can easily pass the Turing 
test along with the machine. Consequently, we should regard both machine and 
Superman, <85> along with the human, as thinking or intelligent entities. But ca n we 
conclude here that all these respondents, human, machine, and Superman, have the 
same internal mechanisms that enable them to pass the test, say that they are all, like 
the machine, computational entities? We cannot say it of Superman, but the same 
goes with the human respondent.   
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The whole point of the exercise is to show that a non -computational system can 
perfectly behave in ways that can be simulated computationally. Thus, the fact that a 
particular behavior can be simulated computationally does not necessarily establish 




Let us now consider how our investigations bear directly on the questions we 
earlier posed; namely, does the computational simulation of the thinking behav iors 
of humans imply that human thinking itself is computational and does the 
computational simulation of the thinking behaviors of humans imply that the 
simulating system itself thinks? With regard to the first question, the answer is in the 
negative; for as we have shown it is logically possible for a non-computational system 
to exhibit behavioral outputs that lend themselves to computational simulations. With 
regard to the second one, however, the answer needs qualifications. We have shown 
that the attribution of thinking to a simulating system is simply based on its functional 
simulation of the thinking behaviors of humans without regard to the type of internal 
mechanism that enables the simulating system to perform the said functional 
simulation. In other words, the computational or non-computational nature of the 
simulating system is irrelevant to the attribution of thinking to the said system. Thus, 
if the computing machine, by means of its computational nature, is able to 
functionally simulate human thinking behaviors then thinking can be attributed to 
this machine. But its computational nature has nothing to do whatsoever with such 
attribution, and hence there is nothing here that will allow the inference that thinking 
is basically a computational process. Given this qualification, the answer then to the 
second question is in the affirmative.  
However, if what the question intends to establish is that in simulating human 
thinking behaviors the simulating computational system thinks in the very same way  
that humans do, the answer to this question then is in the negative. And this is so in 
virtue of the same reason why we have given a negative answer to the first question. 
Machines, like humans, can be said to be thinking, but thinking as defined merely i n 
a functional way, that is, as having the capacity to perform certain functions such as 
those measured in the Turing test.  But in the case of humans, thinking is more than 
just performing certain functions.  <86> Thinking, in the case of humans, is 










1. This paper was read at the Ariston Estrada Seminar Room of De La Salle 
University-Manila on 4 April 2009 in fulfillment of the requirements for the 
Emerita Quito Distinguished Professorial Chair in the History of Thought.  
2. In this essay, we follow the practice of using the expressions “computational 
simulation” and “computer simulation” interchangeably. This practice is based on 
the view, called the Church-Turing Thesis , which states that what is computational 
is what can be implemented in a Turing machine, which is widely regarded as the 
abstract model of the modern-day digital computer.  
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